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Sammendrag 
Denne oppgaven undersøker effektene av økt kvinneandel i norske styrer på selskapets 
lønnsomhet, selskapets risiko, og avlønning til de ansatte. Hovedfokuset i oppgaven er på 
forskjellige perioder i lovgivningsprosessen som krever en viss representasjon av hvert kjønn. 
Funnene i eksisterende litteratur er motstridene om hvordan kvinner i styre påvirker selskapet. 
Hvis kvinner besitter egenskaper som komplementerer eksisterende styrer, vil de ha en 
positive påvirkning, men den effekten vil forsvinne hvis de nyansatte kvinnene mangler de 
nødvendige erfaringene og kvalifikasjonene som assosieres med styremedlemmer. Fra et 
lønnsomhetsperspektiv, fant denne oppgaven ingen klar sammenheng mellom kvinneandel og 
finansiell avkastning. Fra et forretningsperspektiv, viser denne oppgaven at en økning i 
kvinneandelen reduserer finansiell risiko og øker andelen selskapet lønner sine ansatte. Dette 
kan være forbundet med at kvinner er mer opptatt av sine omgivelser, fremfor å fokusere på 
kortsiktige virkninger. 
 Nøkkelord: Kvinnelig styremedlem, Diversitet, Lønnsomhet, Finansiell Risiko, 
 Interessenter. 
Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the impact gender diversity has on firm performance, financial 
risk, and employee compensation over different stages in developing the Gender Balance 
Law. Findings in existing literature are contradicting on contributions derived from an 
increasing share of female directors. Women bring additional value if they possess qualities 
attributable for the boards, however mandating a minimum representation of each gender may 
be harmful if female directors lack the necessary experience and qualifications to fulfill these 
roles. From a firm performance perspective, this dissertation finds no clear relationship 
between an increased diversity and the corresponding returns. From a business perspective, I 
find evidence that an increased share of female directors reduce financial risk and increase the 
portion of employee compensation. This may related to women being more aware of their 
surroundings, rather than focus on short-term effects.  
Keywords: Female directors, Diversity, Firm Performance, Financial Risk,  
 Stakeholder-orientation, GBL. 
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1. Introduction 
This dissertation investigates the effect of gender diverse boards of directors on firm 
performance, employee compensation and the financial risk for Public Limited Companies 
(PLC) listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in Norway. The rationale behind this research is to 
find justification for mandating gender diversity in boards of directors. Firstly, gender 
equality is firmly entrenched in Norwegian society and have been for a long time. In February 
2002, The Minister of Trade, Ansgar Gabrielsen, was quoted saying he was sick and tired of 
the “boys club” not incorporating women on their boards. He continued by saying people 
would be surprised by the radical means he would push through to see this happen (VG nett1). 
In January 2006, Norway became the first country in the world to mandate all Public Limited 
Companies to have a minimum representation of each gender on their board of directors. 
The background for the Gender Balance Law (GBL) stems from public hearings on gender 
equality in 1999 and 2001. The first law suggestion was for all government owned companies 
to have a minimum representation of 40% of each gender and to recommend the same target 
ratio for all PLCs by mid-2005. If the desired target ratio was reached within the deadline, 
further legislation would be unnecessary.  
In the years that followed, the representation of women on boards nearly doubled to 18% in 
2005 (see figure 1) but was still far away from the targeted ratio and the government decides 
to put the new law into effect, forcing PLCs to comply or liquidate their businesses. The 
sanction that non-compliance led to liquidation came as a surprise since prior to this date non-
compliance had no specified sanction and was most likely associated with fines. Nevertheless, 
all PLCs registered after January 1st 2006 was forced to accommodate to the new GBL, and 
existing firms were given a two-year transition period to comply. 
A third option for existing PLCs was to change their organizational form away from PLC to a 
less regulated form like LTD2. The GBL do not affect LTDs and may be a preferred change 
rather than changing board structures. Bøhren and Staubo (2014) find a significant change in 
the number of PLCs after the law was mandated. Not only did companies withdraw, but also 
fewer companies chose to enter that organizational form. Public limited companies appeared 
                                                          
1 http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/moekk-lei-gutteklubben-grei/a/3024189/ 
2 Public limited liability companies (PLC) and limited liability companies (Ltd) is the two organizational forms a 
company can choose with limited liability in Norway. They are regulated by two different Company Acts – 
Limited Companies Act (Aksjeloven) and Public Limited Liability Act (Allmennaksjeloven)  
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TABLE 1 
Important dates in the development of GBL 
Important dates Event 
October 1999 First public hearing on the gender equality act from 1978 
 
July 2001 Second public hearing with proposal that all government 
owned companies and public limited liability companies to have a 
gender representation of 40% 
 
July 22nd 2002 Ansar Gabrielsen made a public statement warning companies to 
increase their gender representation on board of directors  
  
June 2003 The law proposal became effective for all government owned 
companies and voluntarily compliance for PLCs  
 
July 2005 Reassessment of the current situation and mandatory compliance was 
decided 
 
January 1st 2006 Full compliance for PLCs registered after this date, and two years 
transition period for existing PLCs 
 
January 1st 2008 Full compliance for all PLCs 
 
 
less attractive after the reform was mandated, and a possible explanation for this may be that 
the benefits associated with PLC are offset by a greater cost of changing board structures. 
Secondly, the percentage of women directors in the years prior to the compliance periods was 
historically low. Having a stable representation of women below 9% might be as argued by 
Terjesen and Singh (2008) be because females have had trouble acquiring the necessary 
experience associated with directors. This view is consistent with Strøm (2014), who finds no 
systematical discrimination in the years preceding the law. Rather, he argue that the 
underrepresentation of women is because they do not pursue the necessary education or 
career-paths leading to directorships. This gap in qualification will produce a few competent 
women that are highly sought after, the so-called “golden-skirts”. Farrell and Hersch (2005)  
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FIGURE 1 
Evolution of female representatives on Board of Directors in Norwegian PLCs 
 
 
argue that these women tend to serve on boards of better performing firms, which in turn may 
cause a positive effect on performance.  
There are several countries looking to improve their gender equality. For Norway to be the 
first country in the world to mandate such a huge reform puts them at the forefront of gender 
equality in firms and will act as a natural experiment for other countries to study.  
On November 4th 2012, the European Union approved a draft law that sets an objective of 
40% female nonexecutive directors for their members (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013). In 
addition, countries such as Spain, Iceland and France have made recommendations for their 
boards to increase their female representation to the same ratio by 2013, 2015, and 2017, 
respectively (Campbell and Mínquez-Vega, 2008; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). These countries 
have opted for the softer approach of “comply or explain” rather than mandating. However, 
Dale-Olsen, Schøne and Verner (2013) say that mandating forced quotas ensure that the 
desired outcome is more easily reached compared to quota recommendation. Figure 1 shows a 
significant increase in female directors as a result of the gender balance law in the period 
between 2003-2008, before stabilizing around 40%.  
Terjesen and Singh (2008) investigate the presence of female representatives on corporate 
boards in 43 different countries in order to provide explanatory description of the 
environmental context. They find that countries with higher female representation on boards 
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are more likely to have women in senior management as well as more equal pay. They say 
that in addition to individual firm level factors, underlying conditions in the national 
environment can contribute to the female representation of women on boards. Countries with 
a longer tradition of women’s political representation are less likely to have high levels of 
female board members. Scandinavian countries have had a long representation of women in 
government, and Norway had their first female prime minister in 1981. With the first female 
prime minister, Norway had a subsequently increase over the next periods of women holding 
important seats in government and advocating equal rights in the community (Adams and 
Kirchmaier, 2013). However, this do not appear to transcend into the corporate world.  
Terjesen and Singh (2008) present a possible explanation that this may be because early 
adopters of females in government might become complacent and stagnant in further 
promoting females in the corporate sector. 
In their agenda to address the underrepresentation of female board members in Europe, 
Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) quote The European Commission stating: 
“One of the ways of improving Europe’s competitiveness is the equal representation of women 
and men in economic decision-making positions, which contributes to a more productive and 
innovative working environment and helps improve performance. In addition, there is an 
increasing body of research showing that gender diversity pays off and that there is a positive 
correlation between women in leadership and business performance.” -The European 
Commission (2012 b, pp.10) 
If business performance were positively correlating with an increased gender diversity, that 
would make opposing arguments less valid, and people opposing the law would appear 
stubborn and foolish. Their desire to keep their “boys-club” will be at the expense of better 
performance. However, the forced quotas will create upheaval in the current governance 
system, and one of the main criticism of the GBL was that it is too ambitious, and that there 
are not enough qualified candidates to occupy the directorships. Which in turn may result in 
spreading top candidates too thinly over too many boards (Goergen, 2012), or too many 
underqualified women directors. When female directors lack the experience of their male 
counterparts, this will result in a substantial cost for shareholders. This dissertation found no 
conclusive evidence that mandating greater gender diversity leads to better financial 
performance. It did on the other hand find that when the new law became mandatory the 
greater diversity had a negative relationship with firm performance, indicating that firms 
adapted to the corporate board structures most suited for their own agenda prior legislation.  
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The statement from the European Commission that equal representation in economic-decision 
making process can help improve the working environment can be tied to the different 
characteristics women possess compared to men (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Tutchell and 
Edmonds, 2013). Especially in the aftermath of recent financial crises, new regulations can be 
seen as preventive measures for future governance in the same manner that existing 
regulations are inspired by earlier governance scandals. Adding women with different 
preferences than men contributes to boards making sounder decisions and take less risk. This 
dissertation finds a significant correlation between females and the different preference 
measurements examined. The amount of financial risk a firm has adopted is negatively 
associated with a percentage of women directors. Whereas the stakeholder (employee) 
awareness is positively correlated with a greater ratio of women. This suggest that females 
differ from men in their motives for decision-making.  
Gender diversity is an interesting topic with many different aspects, whether it is from a social 
perspective or financial perspective. The purpose of this dissertation is to attempt to uncover 
some underlying effects of greater gender diversity on board of directors to broaden the scope 
of understanding the consequences of the Gender Balance Law.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized with section 2 giving a brief introduction of what 
Public Limited Companies are in Norway and the impact the reform has had for the 
organizational form. It also review existing literature about gender diversity in boards of 
directors and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes my data and explains the 
methodology used. Section 4 provides the models and results. Section 5 is testing my results 
for robustness, and section 6 makes concluding remarks.   
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2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1. Public Limited Companies (PLC) in Norway 
2.1.1. Limited liability companies in Norway 
A law was passed in Norway at year-end 1995/96 stipulating firms with limited liability to be 
divided into two organizational forms – Public Limited Companies (PLC) and Limited 
Companies (LTD). Prior to this separation, no official distinction was made for companies 
with limited liabilities. The reasoning for the classification was The EEA Agreement3 with the 
European Union mandating Norwegian Corporate Law to adapt its policies to accommodate 
the European standards. As one of the last industrialized countries to distinguish between 
limited liability companies, The Norwegian Company Law was subsequently divided into two 
separate Acts, with different regulations and requirements to govern these new organizational 
forms (Bråthen, 2009 pp.13-15).  
One of the requirements that separates the two organizational forms is the demand for startup 
equity. Where LTDs only need NOK 30,0004, PLCs are required of having NOK 1 mill of 
startup equity. Moreover, Limited Companies are considered small since their shareholders 
are usually private and few in numbers, whereas Public Limited Companies are considered 
big, with a vast number of shareholders. The issue of shareholders is one of the major topics 
when discussing the differences between the organizational forms. PLCs are considered to 
have greater minority shareholder protection, with better transparency due to more reporting 
requirements. They are also the only ones given the opportunity to list on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange (OSE). 
Another important distinction is in the regulation of the company board of directors. The 
balance of power in PLCs are subject to rigid requirements, where, depending on 
characteristics such as size, number of employees and gender, the composition of boards are 
less freely exercised compared to LTDs. For example, the CEO of a PLC is prohibited from 
holding a directorship on the board he serves. Furthermore, companies with a certain amount 
of employees are required to have employee representatives on their boards, as well as 
represented by both genders. Norway has a two-tier system that governs the company but the 
Norwegian model permits companies to opt for a structure that resembles the one-tier 
                                                          
3 The EEA Agreement (EØS-avtalen) is an agreement between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and 
the European Union (EU) that allows EFTA members to participate in the EU’s internal markets without being a 
member of the union. In addition to regulate trading, the agreement also stipulates economic conditions 
between the two organizations.  
4 Over my research period the equity requirement was NOK 100 000, but was lowered to NOK 30 000 in 2013.  
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system5. The Company Act for PLCs states that a corporate assembly is formed unless special 
circumstances allows companies to abstain from them6. Nevertheless, companies with more 
than 200 employees have to establish a corporate assembly.  
2.1.2. The Gender Balance Law 
The Gender Balance law (GBL) stems from proposition no. 97 in 2002-2003, where the 
Norwegian Government proposed that board of directors of all stated owned corporations 
should have a minimum representation of approximately 40% of each gender.  
The background for the proposition comes from a public hearing in 1999, when the 
Norwegian government wanted to overhaul the gender equality act from 1978 that specifies a 
minimum of 40% of each genders is represented on committees appointed by a public body. 
The initial suggestion was for boards of all listed firms, with four or more members, to have at 
least 25% of each gender. Following the initial suggestion, the government increased their 
target ratio to 40% and proposed the quota to be incorporated into corporate law instead of the 
gender equality law. The government kept encouraging gender equality in the following years 
before the Norwegian Parliament made a law proposal for voluntarily compliance in June 
2003 for companies to reach a target ratio of 40% by July 1st 2005. If the target ratio was 
reached within the deadline, this would make a new law unnecessary7. By April 2008, all 
PLCs had complied and no firms had to liquidate their businesses (Nygaard, 2011).  
It should be highlighted that the GBL does not mandate a minimum of 40% representation of 
both genders for all board of directors. The law only stipulates how many shareholder-elected 
representatives of each gender is present on boards, depending on board size and gender 
diversity amongst the employees8. For simplification, the number of gender representation at 
different levels are presented in table 2 based on board size. We see that firms with three 
directors are only required one director of each gender, and boards with eight directors only 
need three directors of each gender. Both of these have target ratios below 40%. Furthermore, 
other firm characteristics may cause firms to have lower gender-representation. For example, 
firms with 31-50 employees and four board members are required to have one employee-  
                                                          
5 SEEurope is a project conducted by an internationally composed network of researchers under the leadership 
of the European Trade Union Institute for Reasearch, Education and Health, and Safety (ETUI-REHS, Brussels). 
http://www.seeurope-network.org/homepages/seeurope/countries/norway.html,  
6 Public limited liability act (Allmennakseloven) § 6-35. 
7 Odelstinget Proposition no. 97 2002-2003 
8 Firms with less than 20% gender diversity amongst its employees at the time of director-appointment is not 
required to accommodate the requirements for gender representation for 4-8 board members. Public limited 
liability act (Allmennaksjeloven) § 6-11 a. (2). 
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TABLE 2 
Gender Representation depending on Board size 
Board size Gender representation 
3 1 
4-5 2 
6-8 3 
9 4 
9< 40% 
 
 
represented director. The law only require one of the three directors chosen by the owners to 
be of each gender, whilst the employee representative can be chosen freely, giving a possible 
ratio of 25%. 
Given the possibly legal gender-representations on boards presents implications by 
investigating purely the target ratio of 40%. It will not capture the full effect of how firms 
comply with the GBL and broader board characteristics should, preferably, be incorporated 
when analyzing the law. 
2.1.2.1. The effect of GBL on organizational forms 
The regulatory shift requires firms to change their board structures away from previously 
optimal structures. There is a significant difference in firms choosing to exit from their 
original organizational form. Non-listed firms had a 49% decrease over the period 2002-2008, 
while listed firms had an increase of 11% over the same period (Bøhren and Staubo, 2014). 
They argue that the cost for listed firms to exit is higher than for unlisted firms and the 
benefits gained exceeds the cost of changing organizational form. Non-listed firms are usually 
smaller and have a higher ownership concentration that benefit from dependent directors and 
their ability to produce good advice. Bøhren and Staubo (2014) also find firm characteristics 
relating to exiting firms, such as profitable, small, young, and non-listed. Moreover, these 
firms tended to have strong owners and few female directors prior to the gender law.  
The GBL also saw an increase in the average fraction of independent directors from 46% to 
67% (Bøhren and Staubo, 2014). This growth in independent directors may impair the boards’ 
advisory role over management (Bøhren and Strøm, 2010). Bøhren and Staubo (2014) argue 
that the firms needing independent directors the most, and who pursue diversity would adopt 
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to the law earlier than firms needing advice would. A main reason for these early adopting 
firms may be that they consider the pool of qualified women to be smaller and want to acquire 
the most qualified women before competitors appoint them.  
2.2. Literature and hypothesis 
Existing evidence on the composition and responsibilities of board of directors is conflicting 
and most scholars disagree on the effect gender diversity has for the corporation. In corporate 
finance, a common belief is that the board of directors’ main objective is to maximize the 
wealth of its shareholders through responsibilities such as monitoring and advising, 
controlling the interest of principal and agent, and improving decision-making effectiveness 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010). For more women to enter the boardroom, 
may disrupt these responsibilities and change the tradeoff in which the board is currently 
operating. 
In the literature, female directors are considered outsiders, and if the proportion of outside 
directors or independent directorships increase, evidence suggests that this will bring along an 
improvement of the boards supervising and controlling mission, but at the cost of slower 
decision-making, less firm specific advice, and increased conflict (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; 
Bøhren and Strøm, 2010). This change in dynamic can benefit the owners if the current board 
structure chosen is to maximize the private benefits of the management rather than firm value 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). If this is the case, then imposing legal constraints on board 
structures will increase value and reduce agency cost. On the other hand, if the board 
composition is to maximize firm value, then imposing regulations will lead to a decline in 
value since it will prohibit the board of directors to perform optimally. 
From a firm performance perspective, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that a mandated female 
representation on boards have a substantial decline in firm value. Other researchers (Shrader, 
Blackburn and Iles, 1997; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010) confirm this 
negative relationship when they investigate the effect gender diversity has on firm 
performance over different sample data. The performance measure used to detect this 
relationship is the market-based measure Tobin’s Q. It is a shared belief among scholars that 
this is an adequate measure to uncover any relation between gender diversity and firm 
performance (Dale-Olsen et al., 2013). Ahern and Dittmar (2012) argue the negative effect 
may be because the different characteristics new female directors bring compared to their 
male counterparts. They continue by considering that there is other aspects to the decline in 
performance such as how the retained male directors behave differently after the appointment 
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of new female directors, that women have different preferences than men, or that the quota 
have disrupted boards’ operations.  
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) find a significant positive impact of greater gender 
diversity for their analysis of non-financial firms listed in Madrid during the period 1995-
2000. They argue that the benefits from female directors are greater than the cost of adding 
them. Srinidhi, Ferdinand and Tsui (2011) argue that there is a positive association between 
gender diverse boards and higher earnings quality. They find that firms with female directors 
in auditing committees display better reporting discipline by managers when examining U.S. 
corporations over the period 2001-2007. This linkage could improve earnings quality by the 
benefit women directors bring to boards. Smith, Smith and Verner (2006) find women 
directors tend to have a significantly positive effect on firm performance. However, by 
controlling for unobservable firm-specific factors, the effect often becomes insignificant. 
When it comes to the reform in Norway, Matsa and Miller (2013) compare the voluntary 
compliance period to the mandatory compliance period and arrive at supporting evidence that 
the operating performance declines while the cost increases. They argue, based on earlier 
research, that the newly appointed female directors increased costs because they are more 
altruistic and long-term oriented than male directors. Male directors are more competitive and 
more prone to take excessive-risk (Wilson and Altanlar, 2009).  
Dale-Olsen et al. (2013) find that the impact of the reform in Norway is negligible. They 
argue that the insignificant impact from the reform may imply that either the short-run 
influence of boards is small, or that the new female directors do not bring along additional 
resources or perspectives compared to their male counterparts. Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2008) argue that if women bring additional perspective to the decision-making of the board, 
then they can enhance shareholders value, contrary, if women are appointed as result of 
societal pressure for equality, then the women may have a negative impact. This is supported 
by Fama and Jensen (1983), who suggest that independent directors are more inclined to ask 
questions and thus increasing the board’s ability to control and monitor management. Gender 
diverse boards have more informed deliberations and discuss tougher issues that are often 
considered uncomfortable by men (Srinidhi et al., 2011).  
Bøhren and Strøm (2005; 2010) find that value creation is significantly higher at several 
explanatory variables, such as dependent directors, directors with outside directorships, 
smaller boards, and boards with a low gender diversity. Directors with outside directorships 
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may benefit the firm through valuable networks. In addition, they find that heterogeneous 
boards contribute negatively to firm performance, is more damaging in terms of decisiveness, 
and their ability to produce good advice reduced. Their result indicate that firms should try to 
achieve homogeneous boards from a financial perspective. A contradicting advice to 
advocates who argue that gender diversity will result in better performance.  
Adams and Ferreria (2007) say that regulating the boards to have more independent directors 
reduces the information between the CEO and the board, hurts its advisory role, and may 
reduce its monitoring function. They show that independent directors have stronger 
monitoring incentives than dependent directors, which may hurt the stockholders. Bøhren and 
Staubo (2014) find that smaller and younger profitable firms with few female directors and 
powerful stakeholders need independent boards the least. They argue that these firms need 
advice from dependent directors more than the need for enhanced monitoring from 
independent directors.  Although, the decision of a gender diverse board may be of better 
quality in the end (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003), it can suffer from a slow decision-
making process to rapid market evolvements (Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996, Smith et al., 
2006). 
Existing research shows that board regulations can improve performance if the firm suffers 
from high information asymmetry or if new directors possesses advantageous externalities 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2006; Nygaard, 2008). Nygaard (2008) investigates the information 
scores generated in a survey conducted by PWC in 2005 for all listed PLCs in Norway and 
shows that the direction of the impact depends on firm specific information asymmetry. He 
finds that firms with low information asymmetry experience a positive effect of the quota law. 
A reason for this can be that firms with lower information asymmetry may be striving towards 
trust building, a leadership-style more attributable to women (Klenke, 2003). On the other 
hand, firms with high information asymmetry do not share the information flow adequately 
enough to all parties involved. Family-owned firms or firms with high ownership 
concentration may not share the information with outsiders and therefore create high 
information asymmetry in their firms. Firms with high information asymmetry and few 
female directors are more likely to suffer from the law (Nygaard, 2008).   
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) investigate the causal effect if women on the board 
influences firm performance or if the performance affect the gender composition, and find 
that that the direction of causality comes from gender composition to firm value, not the other 
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way around. A result that may conflict with arguments made by Farrell and Hersch (2005) 
that highly qualified women tend to choose better performing firms.  
The differing evidence of the effect of gender diversity on firm performance is substantial and 
my first hypothesis is formed to further understand the impact a forced compliance will cause. 
Hypothesis 1:  Gender diverse boards of directors will significantly  
affect firm performance. 
In addition to the effect on firm performance, there may be other benefits drawn from an 
increased gender diversity. First, the board of directors’ main task is to supervise the 
company’s operation and make sure they act in the best interest of the shareholders 
(stakeholders). The interests of shareholders are not necessarily the same as the interests of 
stakeholders and researchers disagree on for whom the board of directors should look after 
(Schleifer and Vishny, 1997; Goergen, 2012). For stakeholders such as employees, the need 
for appreciation can conflict with management seeking value maximization.  
Schleifer and Vishny (1997) claim that the board should act on behalf of the shareholders 
(residual claimants), as they are the ones that incur the loss, while stakeholders are more 
likely to be unscathed in the event of downturn. Other researchers argue that the collective 
stakeholders all contribute to value creation and should be for whom the directors look after 
(Ireland, 1999). The differing interests make the decision on what is best governance practice 
a complex and challenging topic. Blindly advocating one universal governance system may be 
unnecessary or in worst case harmful for boards already adjusted with respects to their own 
agenda (Goergen, 2012; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013).  
For their role on the board, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that females are more likely to be 
assigned to audit-, nominating-, and corporate governance systems, and less likely to be found 
in compensations committees than men. They investigate what constitutes good corporate 
governance practices and provide evidence of the relationship between directors’ 
compensation and diversity. One of their findings is that there is a weak positive relationship 
between diversity and total director pay however, they highlight that there is no clear 
consistency between total pay and better governance. For diversity and better corporate 
governance in general, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that there is a positive relationship, 
whereas Strøm, D’Espallier and Mersland (2014) find the opposite. 
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Shrader et al. (1997) say that there is evidence that women are more relationship-oriented than 
men, which is consistent with Adams and Funk (2011) who find that women directors 
emphasizes self-transcendence rather than self-achievement. This is to say that women are 
more likely to make decisions in the best interest of its stakeholders. Increasing the ratio of 
female directors can therefore provide unforeseen effects where the wellbeing of employees 
becomes an important issue. For the reform in Norway, Matsa and Miller (2010) find 
evidence that Norwegian firms became more stakeholder-oriented after the implementation of 
the new GBL.  
The evidence that women are more concerned about their surroundings should improve their 
attitude towards its stakeholders, which leads to my second hypothesis that gender diverse 
boards will offer more compensation to its employees.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with a higher gender diversity on their boards of directors have 
a greater social responsibility to its employees (stakeholders). 
A second benefit drawn from gender diverse boards is female directors’ risk propensity. 
Bøhren and Strøm (2005) say that the problem with addressing board design is that they are 
multidimensional by nature. The demographical differences of directors provides us with 
challenges to predict the full set of values board mechanisms contribute. Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012) find that women are not added to the existing boards following the GBL, but rather 
replacing men as directors. These new board structures with few retained men and new female 
directors could increase board independence, and hence the boards monitoring role according 
to common governance theory. Fama (1980) say that the number of independent directors are 
a reflection of the boards’ monitoring ability. However, this benefit is lost if women are 
marginalized or given nonexecutive roles.  
Females have characteristics that are more independent than the exiting men. Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) find that female directors are on average younger, have less CEO experience, 
are more educated, and are more likely to be employed as nonexecutive managers. 
Furthermore, Tutchell and Edmonds (2013 pp.28) say that women are more risk averse and 
tend to have a greater focus on value preservation. If this is true, women will function better 
in a supervisory position, rather than managing the day-to-day operations, which is consistent 
with findings by Adams and Ferreira (2009).  
Adams and Funk (2009) find that females and male directors differ in their risk attitudes. 
They find that, although women in general are more risk averse than men, female directors are 
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less. A study by Sapeinza, Zinglas and Maestripieri (2009) attributes differences in risk 
behavior to levels of testosterone rather than gender. In the past, board of directors have been 
a male dominated environment, where testosterone levels have been high and overconfident 
investments have been made. For females to enter the boardroom will reduce these levels, as 
they have naturally less testosterone. Wilson and Antanlar (2009) say that psychological 
literature provides evidence that men are more prone to overconfidence, which in turn may 
result in excessive risk taking. They investigate the relationship between gender diversity and 
insolvency risk for over 900 000 limited companies in 2007-2008, and find that female 
directors appear to reduce insolvency risk.  
Schubert, Brown, Gyslar and Brachinger (1999) examine the view that women are more risk 
averse than men in financial decision-making. They find that the contextual setting of 
financial decisions is a determinant for the risk propensity taken. When faced with the same 
context, they find no gender difference in the risk propensity between genders. Byrnes, Miller 
and Schafer (1999) find evidence that men are more inclined to take gambling risks compared 
to women. This gender gap may transcend into men taking more risk in a competitive 
environment. Gysler, Kruse and Schubert (2002) find in an experimental study that when 
faced with uncertainty, women are more conservative investors and take less risky decisions.   
Vathunyoo, Gonzalez and Hagendorff (2014) investigate the relationship between gender 
diversity and risk from the perspective of equity holders. They analyze the movement of stock 
prices for listed companies in the U.S. over a period from 1996-2006. In their reasoning for 
researching this relationship, they summarize studies in economic and psychology that often 
find women to have less appetite for risk than men. They say “… if female directors do 
indeed affect firm risk, the embrace for boardroom gender diversity may alter the risk profile 
of firms in an unforeseen way” pp.3. Even though they find a negative relationship between 
equity risk and female directors, they do not find that increasing the proportion of female 
directors is associated with lower risk.  
Shrader et al. (1997) find that women tend to hold disadvantageous positions, with less 
instrumental impact for the firm. If this is the case, then there is no prior reason to expect 
greater gender diversity to result in better board monitoring. Which leads to my final 
hypothesis investigating the relationship between female directors and risk propensity. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms increasing their gender diversity in the boardrooms 
reduces the firm’s total risk profile. 
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3. Data and method 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
The sample data used to conduct this research are Publicly Limited Companies registered at 
Brønnøysund Register Center9 and on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 2000-
2010. The data gathered from Brønnøysund provides an overview over all board of directors 
for PLCs in Norway over the sample period. The OSE data, on the other hand, contains 
accounting information of all registered firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1980-2011. 
These accounting figures far exceed the board information offered by Brønnøysund and a 
reduction in the accounting period (1999-2010) is done in order to create coherent samples. In 
addition, some figures are missing or cumbersome to construe due to modification in 
accounting practices over the period10. Changing from the old principles to IFRS produces a 
greater value relevance, where income statements are more affected by balance sheets than 
previously (Galåsen, 2010). She studies the effect of changing accounting practices, and 
concludes that accounting figures relating to earnings are less reliable because NGAAP 
recognizes big losses continuously rather than spreading them over numerous accounting 
periods.  
By crosschecking the two datasets against each other, I remove non-listed PLCs and firms not 
registered as PLCs in Norway. Furthermore, financial firms are excluded from the sample 
because they are governed by different regulations. This mitigation of my data reduces annual 
observations, on average, from 507 to 148 firms, leads my sample firms to have an additional 
director each year compared to the full population, and have a higher percentage of female 
representatives before the law became effective (see table 3). A possible explanation for the 
increased gender diversity and extra board member can relate the sample boards to be more 
homogeneous compared to the overall population. Firms listed on the OSE are usually larger 
companies, with more directorships on average compared with smaller PLCs. The listed firms 
also follows a stricter corporate governance code of conduct. For the greater diversity prior to 
legislation, listed companies may be more inclined to incorporate females on their boards due 
to social pressure. Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) find in their research on female participation  
                                                          
9 Brønnøysund Register Centre is a Norwegian government agency managing public registers for all enterprises 
registered in Norway.  
10 In 2005 companies listed on OSE where required to change accounting practices from Norwegian Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (NGAAP) to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Companies with 
listed bonds and companies applying US GAAP had the opportunity to postpone the change until 2007 (Magma, 
2007 – IFRS og norske regnskapsregler). 
16 
 
TABLE 3 
This table shows a descriptive summary of Gender Diversity for each year in my sample data. 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
All            
Number of PLCs 603 631 601 556 523 495 506 484 415 362 339 
Board size 5.14 5.07 5.10 5.10 5.12 5.23 5.21 5.15 5.27 5.27 5.41 
Women  0.32 0.34 0.40 0.51 0.66 0.98 1.33 1.87 2.13 2.09 2.19 
% of women 6.26 % 6.65 % 7.83 % 9.98 % 12.82 % 18.82 % 25.44 % 36.30 % 40.40 % 39.71 % 40.44 % 
            
- Non-listed PLCs 382 416 396 369 314 261 259 218 163 130 108 
- Non-Norwegian 50 50 53 49 60 66 75 73 71 70 69 
- Financial PLC 22 20 20 17 13 13 15 16 17 17 17 
            
Sample            
Number of PLCs 149 145 132 121 136 155 157 177 164 145 145 
Board size 6.19 6.26 6.37 6.31 6.36 6.39 6.47 6.36 6.46 6.37 6.41 
Women  0.47 0.50 0.72 0.89 1.13 1.54 1.94 2.42 2.57 2.54 2.59 
% of women 7.59 % 7.94 % 11.30 % 14.14 % 17.80 % 24.04 % 30.02 % 38.04 % 39.72 % 39.83 % 40.32 % 
Notes: This table shows the level of on Gender Diversity over the sample period for all Public Limited Companies registered in Norway, filters and the sample data used in 
this empirical analysis. The number of eliminated firms showed for each consecutive filter. The filters are non-listed PLCs, firms on the OSE not registered as PLCs in 
Norway, and financial firms. 
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FIGURE 2 
Evolution of female representatives on Board of Directors in sample and population 
 
 
in the labor force and boardroom gender diversity that companies with stricter corporate 
governance codes tend to have higher gender diversity than less transparent counterparts. 
From figure 2 above, we see that the sample data has a more steady growth over the research 
period compared to the population. A reason for this can relate to Bøhren and Staubo’s (2014) 
research into the effect the GBL has on the attractiveness of this organizational form. They 
find that existing PLCs chose to exit from the organizational form, and that new companies 
were reluctant to enter. When new companies entered, they tend to list their company on the 
OSE right away. Furthermore, the trend to exit were strongest amongst smaller, family-
owned, and unlisted PLCs. In my data, these firms are subsequently removed, leaving only 
listed PLCs in my sample. As I mentioned in the literature review in section 2, the companies 
choosing to stay prepare themselves for a potential change in board structure. What is 
interesting is that the evolution of female directors have a congruent increase over the two 
datasets before stabilizing at 40%, and not continue to grow to an equal 50% diversity. 
Table 4 offers an overview of the dispersion of the accounting and board characteristics 
considered. Extreme outliers in accounting changes have been removed and subsequently 
reducing observations for these variables. Furthermore, some firms are entering at a later 
stage and have no prior accounting information for comparison. For board changes, the data 
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TABLE 4 
This table shows a descriptive summary of board specific- and accounting variables gathered 
for this empirical analysis. 
  Mean Stdev Median Min Max Obs. 
No. years 7.845 3.177 9.000 1.000 11.000 1626 
        
Board specific        
Board size  6.362 1.813 6.000 3.000 12.000 1626 
BM age  50.199 4.748 50.333 33.750 69.000 1626 
Diversity  0.248 0.180 0.250 0.000 0.800 1626 
        
Financial specific        
ROA  -0.061 0.328 0.013 -4.205 1.717 1626 
ROE  -0.215 4.206 0.041 -111.466 34.720 1626 
Net income*  399 2924 9.471 -15915 44096 1626 
Total assets*  8513 37414 1025 1.010 643000 1626 
Total equity*  3240 13976 397 -859 219500 1626 
Total debt*  5273 23753 586 -2841 423500 1626 
Debt to Equity  2.082 15.154 1.366 439.333 225.153 1626 
Wages to total assets  0.289 0.903 0.205 0.001 34.356 1545 
        
Measurement specific        
∆ diversity  0.094 0.451 0.000 -1.000 4.000 1337 
∆ ROA  -0.634 13.787 -0.312 -233.977 137.388 1465 
∆ ROE  -0.721 14.519 -0.310 -269.580 137.388 1465 
∆ Net income  -0.441 14.873 -0.230 -217.354 161.301 1465 
* are presented in million NOK. 
Notes:  
All descriptive statistic is calculated from an annually observation of each variable. “No. years” indicate how 
many years on average a firm is present over my sample period, and “BM age” is the average age of board 
members for each firm and year. “Wages to total assets” is employee compensation in the form of wages, 
salaries and social security. 
 
gathered have no information prior to 2000, which leads to a significant reduction in 
observations of diversity change. In addition, the missing Y2000 changes in diversity makes 
this year detrimental for conducting my analysis and hence, my sample period for this 
empirical research is constrained to the period 2001-2010.  
Further reduction is done in my analysis by excluding 2009 and 2010 due to the global 
financial crises (GFC). The global recession highly influence my accounting figures by 
external factors not relatable to gender diversity and can cause biased results. My final sample 
period will be from 2001-2008 for my base-case models in section 4.  
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TABLE 5 
This table shows the number of firms in different diversity levels.  
% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
<10 95 75 55 47 33 16 4 0 
10-20 31 33 36 40 44 37 8 4 
20-30 12 8 14 28 32 27 25 16 
30-40 6 12 12 14 25 45 88 86 
40< 1 4 4 7 21 32 52 58 
         
Obs. 145 132 121 136 155 157 177 164 
Notes:  
This table shows the how many firm observations that reside within different diversity percentages in my sample 
data. Non-listed firms, non-Norwegian firms, and financial firms are not included. 
 
Table 5 shows an overview of the dispersion of firms with different levels of diversity in my 
final sample. We can see that in the beginning of my sample, 95 firms had less than 10% 
diversity. In the consecutive years, firms in this category had a steady decline, while firms in 
the top two categories had a substantial increase.  
3.2. Variables used in this research 
The variables applied in this research are design to capture the diversity effect imposed by the 
GBL. The variables included ranges from specific board characteristics and firm performance, 
to control variables such as size factors and risk factors. The firm specific characteristics 
applied is to incorporate additional explanation to the dependent variable. Examining purely 
the effect of gender diversity without control factors, will not possess the full explanatory 
effect of my dependent variable, offering a minimal R squared (<0.0001). In addition, it can 
generate biased results, as other factors may be more important to explain the linkage. The 
variables used in this dissertation is presented in table 6. 
The data I have gathered do not contain any market information for the firms except market 
value of securities the firms have invested. This makes my research to have accounting-based 
measures rather than market-based measures, and my dependent proxies for my hypothesis 
are in the following order: return on assets, employee compensation, and debt-to-equity. 
When testing for robustness in section 5, alternative proxies is constructed from other 
accounting figures.  
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The board specific characteristics used in this research are mainly (1) diversity, which 
measures the percentage of women to board size, (2) change in diversity from year-to-year, 
(3) board size, and (4) board member age. Controlling for other board specific characteristics 
can prove instrumental in order to detect the gender effects. In the literature section, I 
mentioned that women appointed to boards differ from men in age, being on average more 
than eight years younger (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). I also mentioned that larger boards are 
more inclined to suffer from more conflicts in the decision-making process. Controlling for 
these characteristics will offer a broader scope of the gender diversity relationship. 
For hypothesis 1, I have used the accounting-based performance-measure return on assets 
(ROA). The data do not contain any market-based information to construct a reasonable 
proxy. The lack of market-data does not however suggest that the effect of gender diversity on 
firm performance cannot adequately be measured. Dale-Olsen et al. (2013) argue that there is 
no perfect performance measures to capture the effect of board change. They claim that both 
market- and accounting-based measures lack the necessary scope to include all the factors 
such as changes in accounting rules, anticipation of returns and psychological factors. Where 
altering accounting rules and short-term manipulations are disadvantages of accounting-based 
measures, market-based measures suffer through anticipation from information and 
behavioral psychology. If females are associated with weaker qualifications, then the market 
value will reflect their appointment on boards. Dale-Olsen et al. (2013) continue by saying 
even though Tobin’s Q is often preferred, measuring performance by ROA will be at least as 
adequate to capture the diversity effect.  
Hypothesis 2 have a dependent proxy designed to measure the extent of employee benefits 
from an accounting post in the data gathered from OSE. The total sum of employee wages, 
salaries and social security is a reflection of the compensation employees receive for the 
efforts they contribute to the firm. To compare if highly diverse firms reward their employees 
differently than firms with less diversity, the idea is to detect an underlying trend amongst 
women and the well-being of its employees. Since the total amount of employee 
compensation depend on the size and capital structure of the firm, it is constructed as a ratio 
of employee compensation to total assets. Larger firms with more employees have a greater 
compensation post in absolute figures.  
  
21 
 
TABLE 6 
Empirical proxies in this research 
Variable Definition 
Board specific  
Diversity The percentage of female directors on board of directors 
Board size The total size of the board 
Age Average age of board members 
  
Firm specific  
Size Logarithmic value of total assets 
Risk Debt to equity ratio (DEQ) 
Income Logarithmic value of net income squared 
Wages Wages, salaries and social sec. divided by total assets 
  
Performance  
ROA Net income divided by total assets 
ROE Net income divided by total equity 
  
Additional variables  
∆ diversity Arithmetic change in diversity ratio from 𝑛−1 
∆ income Arithmetic change in net income from 𝑛−1 
Notes: This table shows the empirical proxies used to conduct this research and a description of the design. They 
are based on annual observations of the variables.  
 
To see if women are more risk averse than men, I will measure the financial risk associated 
with the firm. The dependent proxy in hypothesis 3 is the firm’s debt-to equity ratio (DEQ). 
The idea is that this will provide a general idea of the risk profile chosen by the firm. Mao 
(2003) argues that leveraged firms tend to increase investments to increase risk. She discusses 
the risk-shifting problem first put forth by Jensen and Merkel in 197611 that a leveraged firm 
with debt obligations take greater risks in order to accommodate additional fixed costs. It is 
not groundbreaking that additional debt leads to additional risk for a firm’s shareholders. A 
common conception in corporate finance is that risk averse investors seek less leveraged 
investments. As for the financial risk proxy, Bhandari (1988) find that risk averse investors 
have a positive correlation between DEQ and expected common stock returns when 
controlling for explanatory variables not measuring risk. I discussed how female directors 
possess the characteristics of risk aversion in the literature review and hence, greater gender 
diversity should negatively correlate with DEQ if the expected returns remain the same. 
                                                          
11 Introduced by Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. in 1976: “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure”. 
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An important control for my dependent variable is firm size. The size of the firm affects the 
dependent variable on numerous aspects. Larger firms tend to have larger boards, generate 
smaller returns than small high-growth companies, and may have employee-directors 
represented on the board. The capital structure of the firm may also affect the size of the firm. 
Highly leveraged firms can increase their size indirectly through tax-shields generated from 
debt. The proxy designed to represent size is the logarithmic value of total assets. An 
additional control is designed as the logarithmic value of net income squared. For the risk 
control, I use the same DEQ as mentioned above.  
The variables measuring change is constructed to measure the magnitude of change from one 
year’s observation to its previous observation. The purpose of these variables is to provide a 
proxy for the increase (decrease) in the observation on a year-to-year basis. The change is 
calculated arithmetic from t-1 to t. The change in diversity acts to detect the quadratic curve 
of a high diversity ratio. The rationale is that benefits from high diversity is offset by an 
additional increase in the growth rate and vice versa. 
3.3. Econometric approach 
This section will focus on different statistical methods for studying the relationship between 
dependent variable and explanatory variables. My base-case models in section 4 will be a time 
fixed-effects model that assumes a constant mean over the period. This allows for variation in 
the cross-sectional periods due to different annual interference. To understand how fixed 
effects work, first you have to understand some of the background that fixed effect models 
derives from. The prerequisites for this will be explained in the following paragraphs.  
Regression models are a useful tool to uncover if independent variables have any explanatory 
power for the dependent variable. These models can either be used to indicate a predictive 
direction and magnitude, or simply detect the causal historic relationship. In my dissertation, I 
am interested in how gender diversity has a causal effect on my dependent variable rather than 
offer any future predictions.  
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is one of the most well-known and basic regression approaches. 
This statistical approach consider the independent variables in a model and generates 
coefficients for the linear relationship between them and the phenomenon. The linear 
relationship in this method is where the squared differences between actual observations and 
predictive line is the least (Allison, 1999). Because the actual observations do not exactly 
reside on this linear line, a random disturbance term, є, is added to the equation to capture 
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unobserved explanatory factors affecting the dependent variable. This error term relies on five 
assumptions for the relationship to be statistically valid: (1) it has a zero mean in the 
population, (2) the variance of the errors are constant for all values of the independent 
variable, (3) the errors are linearly independent of each other, (4) the error is independent of 
its corresponding independent variable, and (5) the error has to be normally distributed in the 
population (Brooks, 2008 pp.44). 
If the first four assumptions hold, then OLS will be the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator 
(BLUE). Which is proven by the Gauss-Markov theorem when examining an arbitrary 
alternative linear unbiased estimator and finding that in all cases it has an equal or greater 
variance compared to OLS estimates (Brooks, 2008 pp.45). The fifth assumption is required 
to account for interference in the actual population from the sample estimates. The equation of 
an OLS model for panel data will be as followed: 
Ordinary Least Squared Model 
(𝐴)          𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝑖 indicate a specific unit, t denotes the time-period, and n is the corresponding 
coefficient to each variable. Furthermore, the 𝑦 is the value for the dependent variable and x is 
the independent variables used to explain the relationship, β is the coefficient parameter for 
the magnitude of that variable, 𝛼 is the intercept where the line starts, and 𝜖 is the error term 
discussed above. 
The coefficient parameters produced in an OLS method gives us the magnitude of each 
additional increase in the independent variables. These estimates will be accompanied by 
standard errors. These standard errors are standardize by the difference between the 
coefficient and the actual observation used to calculate the model. With no standard errors, 
the model would produce an accurate effect of the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. Conversely, high standard errors will offer a less 
accurate description of the relationship and will invalidate the result and hence, the causal 
effect may not be significant. Insignificant coefficients are less reliable since they vary more 
from the observation. This makes the model less generalizable to the population.  
A violation of independent error assumption can reduce the validity on our results. Highly 
correlated explanatory variables tend to explain the same phenomenon and should not be 
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included in the same model. High correlation can furthermore cause a multicollinearity 
problem where one explanatory variable have predictive power over other explanatory 
variables (Kennedy, 2008). On way to detect multicollinearity is through a pairwise 
correlation matrix between the independent variables. Kennedy (2008, pp.196) says a high 
correlation value (0.8) of one of these correlation coefficients indicates a potential correlation 
problem. However, this correlation matrix only tests variables pairwise and not if three or 
more variables are used in the same model. I have presented the results from a pairwise 
correlation matrix in table 7 on the next page. 
Another approach to detect multicollinearity is the inverse of the correlation matrix, also 
called variance inflation factors (VIF). This will allow me to see if there is a potential 
multicollinearity problem when more than two independent variables are utilized in the same 
model. The level at which this VIF coefficient should be concerned is debated and intuitive 
discernment should be used. However, Kennedy (2008 pp.199) says that we should be 
concerned if the coefficient is higher than 10. The level of my variables are far below this (see 
appendix 1) so multicollinearity should not be a problem12. 
Finally, since regression models generates coefficients based on BLUE of the sample, there is 
an issue of goodness of fit i.e. how well the sample model transcend over to the actual 
population. A common way to measure the goodness of fit is the R squared. This measure is 
calculated by subtracting the residual sum of squares in the regression divided by the total 
sum of squares in the population from 113. A model with a low R squared will not offer a 
good explanatory description of the relationship. Adding more variables will affect the R 
squared, but not necessarily improve the model. Another measurement for capturing the effect 
of added variables is adjusted R squared. Adjusted R square adjusted to the number of 
explanatory variables used in the model. This is not to say it is synonymous with being a 
better representation. A marginal increase in adjusted R squared is rarely a determinant for 
including the additional variable. Moreover, R squared can be useful in financial modeling to 
compare different econometric techniques.
                                                          
12 There is one explanatory variables with VIF coefficient higher than 5 in one of my models, so one of the 
explanatory variables with a high VIF has been removed.  
13 𝑅2 = 1 −
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑔
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡
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TABLE 7 
This table shows pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent variables used in the different econometric models applied to 
this research. 
 
 ROA Diversity Board size Age Size Income Risk Wages ∆ diversity ∆ income 
ROA 1.0000          
Diversity 0.0214 1.0000         
Board size 0.1346 0.1086 1.0000        
Age 0.0393 0.0743 0.0244 1.0000       
Size 0.3261 0.1916 0.4522 0.3060 1.0000      
Income 0.0232 0.2088 0.3186 0.2830 0.4354 1.0000     
Risk -0.0279 0.0258 -0.0000 -0.0231 0.0114 0.0338 1.0000    
Wages -0.1818 -0.1469 0.0302 -0.2821 -0.4559 -0.3042 -0.0027 1.0000   
∆ diversity 0.0477 0.3476 0.0825 -0.0055 0.0514 0.0486 -0.0202 -0.0287 1.0000  
∆ income 0.0534 0.0309 -0.0235 -0.0101 -0.0191 -0.0332 -0.0279 -0.0123 0.0186 1.0000 
Notes: This table shows pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between dependent variables in the three base-case models specified to test my hypotheses. Table 6 defines 
the variables, and the sample is all non-financial Norwegian PLCs listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2000-2010. 
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3.3.1. Panel data 
Since my sample has cross-sectional observations over time for the same entities, there may 
be interference not captured by pooling the entire sample together in an OLS model. 
Econometric methods for panel data is more powerful in controlling for unobservable 
heterogeneity. That is to say, the variance is not constant for each observation of the variable. 
Panel data approaches allow us to research observations changing over time and cross-
sectionally. For financial modelling, a changing environment is a common situation, and by 
combining cross-sectional and time series data one can increase the power of the test through 
capturing the dynamic behavior of the units in the sample. In addition, we can remove the 
impact of certain forms of omitted variables in the regression results, thus accounting for 
endogeneity (Brooks, 2008 pp.487-490). 
There are three main approaches to analyzing panel data: (1) pooling, (2) fixed-effects, and 
(3) random effects. The simplest way to deal with panel data is to estimate a pooled 
regression, similar to OLS. When estimating the relationship using pooled regression, we 
assume the average values are constant over time and cross-sectionally for all units in the 
sample. Which is a strict assumption for observations of a dynamic unit. The fixed-effect 
approach however assumes that the average value changes over time but not cross-sectionally. 
It decomposes the disturbance term in an individual specific effect and in a remainder 
disturbance that changes over time and units. This allows the intercept to vary over the 
different cross-sectional periods, but assumes that they are constant over time. This is a 
reasonable assumption because the individual years are subject to the same environmental 
factors such as the imposing gender diversity requirements and change in accounting 
practices. Thus, the equation for a time-fixed effects model is as followed: 
Time-Fixed Effects Model 
(𝐵. 1)          𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
where 𝜆𝑡 is a time-varying intercept added to capture all the variables that affect y over time, 
and 𝑣 is the “remainder disturbance”. The rest of the equation is defined in (A). 
Since the fixed-effects model assumes that observations means change over time but not 
cross-sectionally, we subtract a fixed-mean for the entire sample period to allow for cross-
sectional variation (Brooks, 2008 pp.493-494). A transformation of equation (B.1) can be 
done to avoid estimating a model containing constant time variance. 
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(𝐵. 2)          𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡 
The line above the variables indicate the average value of that variable, while the rest the 
equation is defined in (A). 
The random effects model also assumes the intercept to vary for each cross-sectional unit but 
remains constant over time. However, the difference is that the random effects model assumes 
the intercept to derive from a common intercept, which is the same for all units. In addition, 
the random variable, 𝜖, is added to measure the random deviation of each units intercept from 
the common intercept (Brooks, 2008 pp.498). This leads to the following equation: 
Random Effects Model 
     (𝐶)          𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
where 𝜔 is a disturbance term consisting of the random deviation of each units intercept and 
the individual observation error term, 𝑣. The new error term, 𝜖, require the assumption that it 
has zero mean, is independent of 𝑣, has a constant variance and is independent of the 
explanatory variables. The rest of the equation is defined in (A). 
This is useful as it allows us to have time-constant variables as explanatory variables. In fact, 
the random effects model should include as many time-constant variables as possible 
(Wooldridge, 2014 pp.399). This adds validity because some of my results may be dependent 
on time-constant factors such as the industry it operates. 
To summarize, some of the main differences between the fixed-effects model and random 
effects model is that while the former treats the intercept as a parameter, the latter treats it as 
an error (Rendon, 2012). The fixed effects model updates prior information on effects, 
whereas the random effects models treats the prior information as final (Brooks, 2008). This 
makes these econometric approaches more favorable for analyzing panel data. One of the 
main advantages of fixed-effects and random effects is that it captures unobservable effect in 
my research sample. The result may not be representable from using a pure OLS approach as 
the data can be subject to cross-sectional variances and over time. Adjusting for these effects 
generally produces more reliable results and hence, a better model to uncover the causality of 
an increased gender diversification.  
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3.2.2 Robust Regression Estimators 
The final econometric approach I will use when testing for robustness in section 5, is the MM-
estimators first introduced by Yohai (1987). These estimators were the first to have high 
breakdown points and high efficiency in errors simultaneously. Whereas least square methods 
are considered to have high efficiency if the underlying assumptions are held, it loses its 
validity if violated. When we talk about the efficiency of an estimator, it is defined as the ratio 
of its minimum possible variance to its actual variance (Stuart, 2011 pp.9). The breakdown 
point, on the other hand, is a measure of the resistance of an estimator (Stuart, 2011 pp.8). By 
that, we mean it is the smallest fraction of contamination the regression estimator can have 
before it breaks down and no longer represents the data.  
MM-estimates is a combination of previous techniques called M-estimator14 and S-
estimator15. M-estimators are the sum of which squared error terms are the weighted average 
of the absolute values of the errors, where the weights are their own values. The idea behind 
M-estimators is to use different weights, in particular to use weights that do not continue to 
grow in magnitude as the absolute value of the error term grows (Stuart, 2011 pp.24). A 
drawback with giving different weights is, although efficient, it has a low breakdown point. 
The S-estimators, however, form a class of high breakdown estimators of regression. In the 
same way that least square estimators minimizes the variance of the residual, S-estimators 
minimize the dispersion of the residuals. Having a high breakdown point will increase the 
resistance of the estimators, but at the expense of low efficiency. MM-estimators attempt to 
retain the robustness and resistance of S-estimation, and simultaneously gain the efficiency of 
M-estimators.  
The MM refers to the fact that multiple M-estimation procedures performed in the 
computation of the estimators. Yohai (1987) introduced the MM-estimates in a three-stage 
process explored below by Stuart (2011 pp.28-29): 
 
Stage 1 A high breakdown point estimator is used to fit an initial estimate, which we denote ?̃?. 
The estimator needs not to be efficient. Using this estimate the residuals, 𝑟𝑖 (𝛽)̃ =
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑇?̃?, are computed. 
                                                          
14 First proposed by Huber (1973): “Robust Regression: Asymptotics, Conjectures and Monte Carlo” 
15 Introduced by Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984): “Robust regression by means of S-estimators” 
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Stage 2 Using these residuals from the robust fit and S-estimator, an M-estimate of scale with 
50% breakdown point is computed. This 𝑠(𝑟1(?̃?), … . , 𝑟𝑛(?̃?)) is denoted 𝑠𝑛. The 
objective function used in this stage is labelled 𝑝0. 
Stage 3 The MM-estimators is now defined as an M-estimator of β using a re-descending 
score function, ѱ1(𝑢) =
𝜕𝑝1(𝑢)
𝜕𝑢
, and the scale estimate 𝑠𝑛 obtained from stage 2. So a 
MM-estimator ?̂? is defined as a solution to 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡ѱ1
𝑛
𝑖=1
(
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑇𝛽
𝑠𝑛
) = 0          𝑗 = 1, . . . . , 𝑝. 
 The objective function 𝑝1 associated with this score function does not have to be the 
same as 𝑝0 but it must satisfy: 
i) 𝑝 is symmetric and continuously differentiable, and 𝑝(0) = 0. 
ii) There exists a > 0 such that p is strictly increasing on [0, a] and constant on [a, ∞). 
iii) 𝑝1(𝑢) ≤ 𝑝0(𝑢). A final solution that must be satisfied by the solution is that 
∑ 𝑝1
𝑛
𝑖−1
(
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑇?̂?
𝑠𝑛
) ≤ (
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑇?̂?
𝑠𝑛
) . 
 
To summarize, the first two stages of the MM-estimation process are responsible for the 
estimator having high breakdown point, whilst the third stage aims for high asymptotic 
relative efficiency. To compare the efficiency of no-constant variance to least square method, 
Brooks (2008) state that the OLS estimating line will swing towards large errors, masking the 
fact that they are outliers. These influential outliers are potentially damaging to OLS because 
they are far away from the usual cluster. It is worth mentioning that the MM-estimator is 
perhaps now the most commonly employed robust regression technique (Stuart, 2011). 
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4. Models and results 
I mentioned in the previous section about the benefits from panel data regression for 
investigating the effects in a dynamic environment. Allowing the unobservable variance in the 
error term to vary cross-sectionally and correlated with a constant alpha in a fixed-effects 
model may offer more robust results than pooling the entire sample together. This aggregated 
econometric approach will be used over three main periods and for the entire sample period, 
where the latter will be my base-case model when testing for robustness.  
The three main periods I have highlighted is the periods leading up to when the government 
made recommendations for compliance in 2003, over the voluntary compliance period (2004-
2005), and finally over the mandated compliance period (2006-2008). The rationale behind 
structuring the sample period into sub-periods is to detect if there is any change in the 
direction of the effect over different stages of legislation.  
The general structure of my model will be based on a transformation of the fixed-effects 
model provided in section 3.3 to a demeaned model (Brooks, 2008 pp.493): 
?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑠)̈ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)̈ 𝑖𝑡 + ?̈?𝑖𝑡  {
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁
𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇
 
where the double dots above the variables indicate demeaned values, i  is the firm,  t is the 
time period, 𝑢 is the varying disturbance not affected by time, and α and β is the magnitude of 
effect that we want to estimate. The diversity mechanisms are the diversity ratio and the 
change in diversity ratio for each observation, and the control variables ranges from board 
specific to firm specific depending on my dependent variable.  
Bøhren and Strøm (2010) summarize the importance of accounting for the time-series nature 
of data with problem caused by dependence in the residuals. This may be due to firm fixed 
effect or an overall shock for all firms. Such effects may introduce endogenity caused by 
omitted variables, which influences the regression. They go on saying the stronger these 
effects are the more the estimates from a pooled regression will be biased and inefficient. 
However, a fixed-effects estimation with robust standard errors will adjust for these 
unobservable firm and year effects (Bøhren and Strøm, 2010 pp. 1295).  
I will justify which variables are used in each of the consecutive hypotheses in the following 
three sections before discussing the results.  
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4.1. The impact of the reform on firm performance 
In section 3.2, I discuss how a company’s return on asset is not a perfect measurement for 
isolating the effect of gender diversity however it is an adequate measure. In an effort to 
isolate the effect of diversity on ROA, control variables are included in the model. Board size 
is included as researchers have shown that larger boards will affect the board’s decision-
making ability (Bøhren and Strøm, 2005:2010), a key determinant for firm performance. 
Financial performance is also highly linked with the associated risk. The firm’s capital 
structure will affect the performance on several different levels. Leveraged firms pursue more 
high-risk investments to account for the additional fixed financial obligation they succumb 
(Mao, 2003). The return is also associated with the sector a firm operates in, and it is common 
knowledge that some sectors operate with more leverage than others. A fixed effect model 
cannot test for variables that are constant over time such as sector, and the risk measure will 
indirectly represent high-risk environments. Furthermore, normal corporate governance 
theory state that risky projects should generate greater payoff for the extra uncertainty 
associated. In addition to risk, size is an important control. Smaller high-growth firms earn 
excessive returns compared to large mature firms. The two controls also has a potential 
synergy, where additional debt will increase the total assets both through more debt and tax 
shields.  
The income variable is included to act as an additional proxy to capture the size of operations. 
The change in accounting practices in 2005 put more attention to the balance sheet than the 
income sheet (Galåsen, 2010), which could lead to a reduction in ROA even with unchanged 
earnings. A final control is designed to distinguish between firms with high diversity and 
firms with no diversity. Firms that already have high diversity ratios may not be influenced in 
the same way as firms without any females.  
Results 
Table 8 shows the results. The results are accompanied by hetereoscedastic robust standard 
errors. We can see that in the period preceding government proposal, there is no significant 
effect of gender diversity. The insignificant effect may be because of the low diversity in 
general over this period. Many firms had no female directors in this period and the average 
diversity was about 10% for all firms.  
32 
 
TABLE 8 
A regression model to see the relationship between firm performance and gender diversity. 
The performance proxy used is return on assets (ROA). 
 
 2001-2003 2004-2005 2006-2008 2001-2008 
Diversity -0.258 (0.278) 0.511 (0.223)** -0.324 (0.111)*** -0.272 (0.104)*** 
∆ diversity 0.019 (0.029) -0.081 (0.022)*** 0.074 (0.022)*** 0.001 (0.000)** 
     
Control factors     
Board size -0.038 (0.030) -0.025 (0.029) 0.010 (0.018) -0.001 (0.009) 
Risk -0.000 (0.000)* 0.012 (0.010) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Size 0.111 (0.140) 0.135 (0.073)* 0.082 (0.033)** 0.138 (0.031)*** 
Income -0.061 (0.018)*** -0.004 (0.006) -0.017 (0.007)** -0.029 (0.006)*** 
     
Dummies     
Dummy high/low Yes Yes No Yes 
Dummy year No No No Yes 
     
R squared 0.1832 0.2751 0.1389 0.2087 
Obs. 375 246 436 1057 
Notes: This table shows the effect of gender diversity over different stages in the legislation from a fixed-effect 
technique. Dependent variable is return on assets (ROA). Statistical significance coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all non-
financial Norwegian PLCs listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
In the voluntary compliance period, the results show a positive significant relationship 
between gender diversity and firm performance. More firms appointed women and the overall 
effect of this increase led firms to benefit from improved financial performance. An 
increasing change ratio will however reduce this positive relationship gained from greater 
diversity. The negative coefficients for change in diversity implies that the scale of change 
should not be increased. In this period, firms are allowed to adjust gradually and in respect to 
their own interests. In the literature review, I discuss how the general pool of qualified women 
are considered smaller and that the best female directors are swept away at an early stage. The 
results indicate that over this period, the early adapters benefit from the “golden-skirts”. 
However, another explanation is that good firms are the ones that appoint women in this 
initial adaptation stage and hence contribute to this positive relationship. 
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I find supporting evidence that legal constraints on board of directors will have a negative 
effect on boards wanting to maximize firm value (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). We see that the 
positive effect produced in the voluntary compliance period turned negative as it is no longer 
optional for the firms. The negative significant relationship between gender diverse boards 
and firm performance informs us that firms suffer from forced regulations. Firms cannot 
choose the board composition best suited for their agenda. I did not include the high/low 
dummy since all firms were required to accommodate with one of the specifications.  
For the entire period, gender diversity is negatively associated with firm performance. The 
coefficients are significant, stating that performance will not benefit from an increased 
diversity. This generates support for many studies finding a negative relationship. It should be 
mentioned however that the scope of change is positively correlated. Signifying that an 
increased change in diversity will offset the negative impact, and that the negative effect 
caused from diverse board will only sustain up to a certain level. I have adjusted for year 
effects by including time dummies and for firms already being gender diverse. Bøhren and 
Strøm (2010 pp.1295) say that the more firms relative to years in the panel, the more critical 
is adjustment for firm effects compared to time effects. I have 1057 observations over eight 
years so accounting for fixed firm effects is the more important adjustment. 
Addressing these results in accordance with previous literature, I find no conclusive evidence 
that firms cannot benefit from gender diversity, nor that they do benefit. The positive 
relationship in the voluntary period indicates that there were some positive synergies 
produced from women on board of directors. Another possible explanation is that good firms 
were the early adopters. Table 9 shows the dispersion of firms with good performance in the 
beginning of my sample and the subsequent change in their proportions of gender diversity. 
We can see that firms with above average performance in 2001-2003 have significantly 
increased their proportion of female directors in the second period. The negative relationship 
over the mandating period and the full sample period may be because the legal requirements 
led to women being appointed as directors irrelevant of firm’s needing them or not. When all 
firms are obliged to increase their diversity, this also applies to firms underperforming with 
male directors. Another explanation is that, in general, firms suffered from poorer returns over 
this period, even the good firms from the voluntary period. The average returns were 
significantly smaller in the mandated period (-3.92%) compared to the voluntary period 
(1.59%). 
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TABLE 9 
This table shows the dispersion of firms with higher than average firm performance. 
% 2001-2003 2004-2005 2006-2008 
<10 90 19 2 
10-20 38 16 4 
20-30 19 25 25 
30-40 4 12 43 
40< 1 12 37 
    
Obs. 152 84 111 
Notes: This table shows firms with higher than average firm performance in the preceding period and the 
dispersion of these firms in the next period. The dispersion of 2004-2005 and 2006-2008 are based on firms with 
above average performance in 2001-2003 and 2004-2005, respectively. The average performance measure is 
return on assets.  
 
4.2. The impact of gender diversity on employee compensation 
The purpose of this model is to provide a general idea of the relationship and the impact of 
diversity, if any, on employee compensation. I discussed in the literature review how females 
are more inclined to nurture relationships and look after the wellbeing of stakeholders rather 
than shareholders.  
Board decisions are hardly influenced by female directors alone. Other board specific 
characteristics are essential for how the firm rewards its employees in addition to diversity. 
The importance of board size is covered in section 4.1. Furthermore, the age of board 
members is important. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that the there is a difference in the age 
of female directors and male directors. Women were on average eight years younger than 
men, which makes age a potential influencing factor. Some firms may have no age difference 
while others have younger women pulling the average down.   
Employee compensation is a debated topic. There are different schemes for firms to reward its 
employees, whether it is through fixed salaries, performance-based salaries, or fringe benefits.  
The purpose of a fair compensation is to motivate their employees to perform and add value 
for their efforts. In an article by Levin (2013), he finds that his employees do not consider 
performance-based bonuses as a part of their compensation, and subsequently act as a mean to 
demotivate rather than motivate. However, he argues that the right bonus-scheme can be a 
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useful tool if structured appropriately. The hypothesis in section 2.2 intuitively makes a 
greater diversity to be positively associated with the compensation offered.  
In the same manner that size is an important control variable for firm performance, it has 
important aspect for employee compensation. Larger firms with over 200 employees are 
required to have employee directors, and firms with 31-200 employees are obliged to do so if 
at least half the employees vote for it16. The purpose of these employee directors is to 
represent other employees in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the size of the firm 
can be detrimental for the employee compensation ratio in terms of capital structure. Debt 
financing will increase the total assets but may not necessarily increase the compensation. 
Debt is associated with an increased risk and offering employees additional wages can be 
challenging in the case of failure.  
The associated risk can capture the volatility of the firm in case of downturn. Having high 
fixed wages will increase the fixed cost of the firm. In addition, some industries have higher 
debt ratios than others. A firm operating in a high-risk environment can have wages and 
salaries tied to performance rather than fixed, whereas fixed wages and subsequent fixed costs 
for the firms can be used for larger mature firms. A change in a firm’s net income can offer an 
explanatory impact of the amount of compensation received on both the cost associated and 
for future prospects of its employees. Where a positive change can lead to employees being 
rewarded with higher wages or bonuses, conversely a negative change can cause pay-cuts, no 
bonus, or in worst cases layoffs.  
Results 
Table 10 shows the results. The results are accompanied by hetereoscedastic robust standard 
errors. We see that there is a positive significant impact from diversity for each of my sub-
periods and over the entire sample. We also see the coefficients have approximately the same 
size. This indicates that firms with more women on their boards have a greater compensation 
ratio than firms with fewer females. There is no clear indication in current literature about the 
relationship, but I argued in section 2.2 that women on boards are more inclined to look after 
the well-being of all its employees. Other stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, or the 
community in which it operates are not tested for in this analysis. We see that the magnitude 
of the coefficients in all periods are approximately the same. This indicates that the additional 
                                                          
16 Some industries are exempt from this requirement; newspaper and news agencies, shipping, oil and 
extraction, and financial firms.   
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TABLE 10 
A regression model to see the relationship between employee benefits and diversity, 
controlled for firm specific factors. 
 2001-2003 2004-2005 2006-2008 All periods 
Diversity 0.256 (0.140)* 0.296 (0.096)*** 0.232 (0.098)** 0.236 (0.061)*** 
∆ diversity -0.023 (0.008)*** 0.010 (0.003)*** -0.004 (0.018) -0.011 (0.007) 
     
Control factors     
Board size 0.032 (0.008)*** 0.035 (0.007)*** 0.046 (0.002)*** 0.038 (0.004)*** 
Age -0.008 (0.002)*** -0.009 (0.001)*** -0.004 (0.001) *** -0.007 (0.002)** 
∆ net income -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)** 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Debt to Equity -0.000 (0.000)* 0.011 (0.004)*** 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 
Size -0.093 (0.005)*** -0.062 (0.003)*** -0.069 (0.003)*** -0.062 (0.005)*** 
     
Dummy high/low Yes Yes No Yes 
Dummy  years No No No Yes 
     
R squared 0.3037 0.3351 0.3326 0.3566 
Obs. 368 234 412 1009 
Notes: This table shows the effect of gender diversity over different stages in the legislation from a fixed-effect 
technique. Dependent variable is employee compensation. Statistical significance coefficients at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all non-
financial Norwegian PLCs listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
women added to the boards in the following periods have not changed the effect women have 
on compensation. Comparing the initial period with the other periods, offers validity that 
female directors affect employee compensation and that it is not just attributable to the few 
firms with female directors. I have used the same high/low dummy covered in section 3.2 for 
my first two periods and over the full sample. In addition, I have used a year dummy to adjust 
for external shocks in any particular year for my full sample.  
The effect of an increasing change in diversity do not produce significant values for all 
periods, nor positive values. For the initial period, leading up to the mandated law, an 
increased growth in diversity was negatively correlated. The growth in gender diversity over 
this period was not substantial nor carried out by all firms in the sample. Some firms did not 
appoint women on their boards at all, while others had a decrease of female directors. What 
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applies to observations in the initial period is that board structures are unregulated. In the 
mandatory period, all firms were required to change drastically. Since this premise applies to 
all firms over the sample, the shared gender diversity growth may have led to an insignificant 
coefficient for this period. However, we see that the insignificant change in diversity also 
applies to the full period.  
There is supportive evidence that female directors influence the employee compensation ratio, 
and this do not change with more firm observations. The fact that women have these qualities 
associated with relationship- and trust-building become apparent with regard to the amount of 
compensation they provide. There can be other aspects affecting the amount of compensation 
received, such as performance-based salaries. The period has had a positive economic growth 
and employees may have benefitted from their firms’ performance.  
4.3. The impact of gender diversity on firms’ risk profile 
The purpose of this model is to provide a general idea of the relationship and the impact of 
diversity, if any, on a firm’s financial risk. There are numerous other factors attributable to 
explain the current debt-to-equity ratio, and an array of control factors are used to account for 
this. I discussed how board size and age are important board specific factors to include, as 
they possess explanatory power for the board’s decision. Larger boards tend to have more 
conflicts and are less flexible to changing environments, which may lead to decision inertia. 
Furthermore, age is associated with different risk preferences. Typical characteristics among 
young entrepreneurs is that they are more risk seeking compared to mature directors.  
In corporate governance theory, the size of a firm may be detrimental for the capital structure 
chosen. Two important theories of capital structure for firms are the trade-off theory and the 
pecking-order theory. The trade-off theory suggests that there is a trade-off between debt and 
equity and that there is an optimal level of this ratio that the firms wants to obtain, while the 
pecking-order theory argues that the additional financing is ranked with respect to funding. 
Lemmon and Zender (2010) research the theorem proposed by Myers and Majluf17 that 
asymmetric information is a determinant for which theory is applicable for firms. Smaller 
high-growth firms may have trouble obtaining debt financing because of this asymmetric 
information and therefore more inclined to issue equity as a source for additional growth. 
They also find that firms with debt constraints are more likely to issue significant amounts of 
                                                          
17 Myers, S.C., and N.S. Majluf. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information 
That Investors Do Not Have”. Journal of Financial Economics, 13 (1984). 
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equity and that firms with equity issuances grow, on average, more than non-issuers, but 
experience a lower return on assets compared to non-issuers. In addition, they find that equity 
issuers in this group have smaller debt ratios and if they had used debt for their financial 
deficits, their debt ratios would increase by 29%. 
The return of a firm’s asset can offer a good explanation of the firm’s growth potential. Larger 
mature firms usually need less debt as they do not need additional capital for investment 
opportunities. This is not to say that mature firms opt away from any debt financing. Debt can 
offer positive benefits in addition to increased risk. Firms financing investments with debt 
gain a coinciding tax shield so the increased leverage has a dual effect on its total assets. The 
tax shield will increase the equity side of the balance sheet through higher cash flows. 
However, increasing debt distorts the assets towards a more risky setting.  
Another important constraint on a firm’s risk profile is the industry in which it operates. I 
mentioned that some industries are known to have a higher debt norm than others. The model 
cannot incorporate industry specific dummies because the method used by the fixed-effects 
approach. Not testing for industry specific norms can cause biased results in my model 
however, when testing for robustness in section 5, the base-case model offers similar results 
as a robust regression with industry dummies.  
Results 
Table 11 shows the results. The results are accompanied by hetereoscedastic robust standard 
errors. The dependent variable is the logarithmic value of debt-to-equity. We can see that in 
the initial period before, voluntary compliance was recommended, the coefficients are not 
significant. This can be due to the low percentage of females on board of directors. Some 
firms in the period preceding any official recommendation had no women directors whereas 
others only had a bare minimum of women on their boards. The negative direction is however 
supported by the rest of the periods. 
In the next two periods, the analysis produces negative significant relationships between the 
financial risk and gender diverse board of directors. The magnitude of the coefficients are 
quite substantial with -1.143 and -1.292, respectively. This indicates that women are indeed 
more occupied with value preservation rather than pursuing risk. There is a slight increase 
over the two periods, where mandatory compliance has a greater diversity coefficient than 
voluntary compliance. This increase, although small, can be caused by external  
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TABLE 11 
A regression model to see the relationship between the proxy as a risk measure and gender 
diversity, controlled for firm specific factors. 
 2001-2003 2004-2005 2006-2008 All periods 
Diversity -0.250 (0.329) -1.143 (0.118)*** -1.292 (0.282)*** -0.836 (0.243)*** 
∆ diversity -0.045 (0.131) -0.006 (0.191) -0.045 (0.091) -0.017 (0.071) 
     
Control factors     
Board size 0.059 (0.029)** 0.082 (0.026)*** -0.038 (0.045) 0.028 (0.028) 
Age -0.008 (0.004)** -0.018 (0.019) -0.047 (0.004)*** -0.023 (0.007)*** 
Size 0.126 (0.019)*** 0.159 (0.021)*** 0.235 (0.025)*** 0.177 (0.0223)*** 
ROA -0.021 (0.059) -0.071 (0.394) -0.253 (0.007)*** -0.058 (0.060) 
     
Dummy year No No No Yes 
     
R squared 0.0739 0.1169 0.1291 0.0948 
Obs. 366 245 431 1042 
Notes: This table shows the effect of gender diversity over different stages in the legislation from a fixed-effect 
technique. Dependent variable is a risk proxy (Debt-to-equity). Statistical significance coefficients at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all 
non-financial Norwegian PLCs listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
macroeconomic factors other than the higher diversity, such as financial distress. The global 
financial crises in 2008 (2007), may force companies to reduce their debt profiles to avoid the 
possibility of not being able to accommodate with fixed obligations.   
The negative relationship is supported by a significant coefficient for the entire sample period. 
This is consistent with common perception about women being more risk averse compared to 
men. However, this is not consistent with results from the personality features proposed by 
Adams and Funk (2011), that female directors are less risk averse than male directors. 
Interpreting the change in gender diversity, the model do not produce significant values for 
any of the periods. A possible explanation may be that the increased (decreased) gender 
diversity from observation to observation do not affect the changes in the risk profile chosen 
by the firm, nor that an increasing diversity is contributing. The coefficients are also negative, 
implying that gender diversity is purely negatively associated with financial risk.  
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5. Robustness 
5.1. Econometric approach 
If you recall from section 3.3.1 about OLS regression, the variance has to be constant for 
standard errors across all observations i.e. 𝑉(𝜖𝑖) = 𝜎
2 for all i. A violation in this condition 
results the OLS regression to be heteroscedastic. Heteroscedasticity in the standard error 
variance makes the regression line no longer BLUE, where some outliers will cause 
interference in the best linear model. This loss in efficiency may be substantial and invalidate 
the results (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). Breusch and Pagan say that introducing random 
coefficient variation allows for a less rigid condition to the standard linear model and allows 
each observation different variance.  
Plümper and Neumayer (2012) refer to existing research on model misspecifications that 
neither econometric tests nor data mining can give a sufficient guidance to specify an 
econometric model, which exactly duplicate the data-generating process. This makes 
estimates produced in these models biased and standard errors do not reveal the true nature of 
uncertainty. They continue by arguing that existing robustness methods used by scholars, 
suffer from misspecifications and insufficient quantity of robustness tests. For an estimated 
result to be truly robust, the interference the researcher makes with respect to tested 
hypothesis or predications does not materially change the estimated coefficients. 
To test if my model-specifications require an additional term to intercept this interference, a 
Breusch-Pagan test18 is used to detect heteroscedasticity in the OLS model. If the test proves 
significant, then there is a violation of the assumption regarding the error term and different 
approaches should be used to capture the unobserved variance. From table 12, 13, and 14, we 
see that the Breusch-Pagan test detects heteroscedasticity in the OLS technique (model 2) for 
all three hypothesis and another technique should be applied to correct this interference.  
Fixed-effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models are usually applied to panel data, because 
they allow us to analyze observations both cross-sectional and over time. They have different 
advantages and disadvantages. We can only use RE if we are willing to assume that the 
unobserved effects is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2014). The RE 
should therefore include as many time constant variables as possible as explanatory variables. 
This uncorrelated condition is why we do not discard the intercept from the regression. The 
                                                          
18 A test developed by T.S. Breusch and A. R. Pagan in 1979 to test for simple heteroscedasticity and random 
coefficient variation. 
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FE do not however assume the unobserved effects to be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables nor the intercept, which is why it is dropped from the regression result. Because FE 
allows for an arbitrary correlation between the explanatory variables and the intercept, it is 
usually more convincing to consider everything else unchanged. The implication with FE is 
that time-constant variables cannot be used. 
In addition to these techniques, I have run a robust regression model with high breakdown 
point and high efficiency also called MM-estimates. These estimates have the properties that 
they are highly efficient when the errors are normally distributed and have a breakdown point 
of 0.5 (Yohai, 1987). The breakdown point measures the maximum fraction of outliers a 
sample can contain without ruining he estimates completely. Robust regression do not have 
the same hold amongst scholars for analyzing panel data as FE and RE have. This is not to say 
that robust regressions are less accurate, but an explanation can be that the calculations are 
more cumbersome to perform manually. However, most statistical software have packages to 
do this for us19.   
Testing for the significance of my base-case estimates against other estimates, the Hausman 
test shows that both model (2) and (3) in table 12, 13, and 14, are inconsistent with my base-
case (1), which strengthen the impression of misspecification of econometric technique to 
explain unobservable heterogeneity. 
For table 12, the alternative econometric techniques used do not produce significant values. 
The standard errors in model (1) and (3) are controlled for heterogeneity. Model (3) do not 
generate significant values whether with industry dummies or without, indicating that the 
variance is at firm level rather than industry level. Testing for year dummies in model (3), do 
however produce significant negative coefficient for gender diversity on firm performance, 
suggesting that the different years, experience the same environmental pressure over the time-
period. We can see that the increasing change in gender diversity is significant for model (1) 
and (4) but with different directions. This makes the impact difficult to construe and 
depending on econometric technique used rather than supportive explanatory power. The 
effect of gender diversity has also been tested in a cross-sectional OLS analysis (see appendix 
2). The cross-sectional results showed no significant values. This may be due to the few 
observations for each year. 
                                                          
19 R package: “robust” 
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TABLE 12 
Alternative econometric techniques for the relationship between firm performance and gender 
diversity 
 Fixed-Effects OLS Random effects Robust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Diversity -0.272 (0.104)*** -0.065 (0.089) -0.688 (0.440) 0.039 (0.038) 
∆ diversity 0.001 (0.000)** -0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.003) -0.000 (0.000)*** 
     
Control factors     
Board size -0.001 (0.009) -0.011 (0.005)** -0.031 (0.041) -0.001 (0.002) 
Risk -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) -0.086 (0.049)* -0.004 (0.000)*** 
Size 0.138 (0.031)*** 0.120 (0.007)*** 0.319 (0.151)** -0.006 (0.003)** 
Income -0.029 (0.006)*** -0.037 (0.003)*** -0.105 (0.042)** 0.007 (0.001)*** 
Constant  -0.929 (0.073)*** -2.348 (1.506) -0.048 (0.027)* 
     
Dummy high/low Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy  years Yes Yes No Yes 
Dummy sector No Yes Yes No 
     
R squared 0.2089 0.2798 0.2013 0.0492 
Obs. 1057 1057 1057 1057 
     
Hausman test  0.000 0.000  
Breuch-Pagan test  0.000   
Notes: This table shows Fixed-Effects, Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Random Effects and Robust regression for 
my models. The Fixed-Effects model is the base-case for the full period in table 8. The dependent variable is 
return on assets (ROA). Statistical significance coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are marked with ***, **, 
and * respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all non-financial Norwegian PLCs listed on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
In table 13, we see that all econometric techniques are consistent with respect to gender 
diversity and the change in gender diversity. The standard errors in model (1) and (3) are 
controlled for heterogeneity. They all show a positive relationship with more women on 
boards of directors with the proxy used to represent employee compensations. It seems fairly 
robust to different econometric approaches all signifying the same relationship. The 
increasing change of diversity however, appears to have a negative effect on employee 
compensation, although neither of the techniques produce a significant impact of a greater  
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TABLE 13 
Alternative econometric techniques for the relationship between employee compensation and 
gender diversity 
 Fixed-Effects OLS Random effects Robust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Diversity 0.236 (0.061)*** 0.233 (0.082)*** 0.114 (0.063)* 0.155 (0.070)** 
∆ diversity -0.011 (0.007) -0.010 (0.015) -0.006 (0.007) -0.007 (0.013) 
     
Control factors     
Board size 0.038 (0.004)*** 0.036 (0.004)*** 0.037 (0.003)*** 0.048 (0.004)*** 
Age -0.007 (0.002)** -0.004 (0.002)*** -0.004 (0.002)** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
∆ net income -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Risk -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Size -0.062 (0.005)*** -0.068 (0.005)*** -0.069 (0.004)*** -0.063 (0.004)*** 
Constant  1.162 (0.089)*** 1.157 (0.098)*** 1.098 (0.065)*** 
     
Dummy high/low Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy  years Yes Yes No Yes 
Dummy sector No Yes Yes No 
     
R squared 0.3566 0.3724 0.3678 0.3069 
Obs. 1009 1009 1009 1009 
     
Hausman test  0.000 0.000  
Breuch-Pagan test  0.000   
Notes: This table shows Fixed-Effects, Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Random Effects and Robust regression for 
my models. The Fixed-Effects model is the base-case for the full period in table 10. The dependent variable is 
employee compensation. Statistical significance coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are marked with ***, **, 
and * respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all non-financial Norwegian PLCs listed on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 
change. If the results are consistent across the econometric approaches the conclusion from 
base-case results are strengthened. 
In table 14, the results are not consistent over the different econometric techniques. The 
standard errors in model (1) and (3) are controlled for heterogeneity. We can see that neither 
model (2), nor (3) have significant coefficients for diversity, and given the significant 
negative direction of my base-case model, this indicate that the unobservable heterogeneity  
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TABLE 14 
Alternative econometric techniques for the relationship between financial risk and gender 
diversity 
Notes: This table shows Fixed-Effects, Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Random Effects and Robust regression for 
my models. The Fixed-Effects model is the base-case for the full period in table 11. The dependent variable is a 
risk proxy (DEQ). Statistical significance coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are marked with ***, **, and * 
respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all non-financial Norwegian PLCs listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
varies cross-sectional and the data cannot be pooled over time. From my robust regression 
techniques, the high efficiency in errors and high breakdown point appear to produce reliable 
results. The high breakdown point gives the largest fraction of arbitrary gross errors tolerated 
before the sample yields unreliable results. 
To summarize, we can see that, apart from table 13, that the econometric approach is 
instrumental for the results. The results from the effect gender diversity has on employee 
compensations are robust to the different econometric techniques used, offering significant 
 Fixed-Effects OLS Random effects Robust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Diversity -0.836 (0.243)*** -0.293 (0.377) -0.051 (0.301) -0.979 (0.375)*** 
∆ diversity -0.017 (0.071) -0.026 (0.068) -0.074 (0.053) 0.078 (0.069) 
     
Control factors     
Board size 0.028 (0.028) 0.015 (0.020) 0.013 (0.021) 0.026 (0.019) 
Age -0.023 (0.007)*** -0.029 (0.007)*** -0.030 (0.007)*** 0.001 (0.007) 
Size 0.177 (0.0223)*** 0.122 (0.024)*** 0.122 (0.027)*** 0.141 (0.021)*** 
ROA -0.058 (0.060) -0.176 (0.110) -0.210 (0.104)** -0.015 (0.155) 
Constant  0.093 (0.420) 0.127 (0.329) -1.723 (0.364)*** 
     
     
Dummy high/low No Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy  years Yes Yes No Yes 
Dummy sector No Yes Yes No 
     
R squared 0.0948 0.1962 0.1884 0.0771 
Obs. 1042 1042 1042 1042 
     
Hausman test  0.000 0.000  
Breuch-Pagan test  0.001   
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coefficients across all approaches. For the other two hypothesis, allowing unobservable 
effects to correlate with the independent variable and intercept produces significant results, 
while assuming it to be constant (model 2) or uncorrelated (model 3) produces insignificant 
results. To account for outliers while still produce highly efficient results (model 4) do not 
help explaining the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance, but it do help 
explain the relationship between gender diversity and financial risk. 
5.2 Empirical proxies 
This section investigates the empirical proxies used as dependent variables in my models. 
Different control variables have been tested for size and risk but have been excluded either 
because too high correlation with other explanatory variables, providing similar results or 
deemed theoretically irrelevant. The standard errors are controlled for heteroscedasticity. 
Independent proxies 
In order to see how firm performance relate to gender diversity I have tested a different 
accounting measurement, ROE. This is closely related to ROA but may be more influenced 
by the size and capital structure of the firm. Ideally, I would have tested for a market-based 
proxy such as Tobin’s Q, however my data do not contain any information about market 
values. A highly leveraged firm will generate larger returns to their equity as they have 
additional money to invest. Furthermore, the amount of equity is related to the industry the 
firm operates. Some industries are more volatile and have fewer investment opportunities than 
others. Nevertheless, the results from substituting firm performance proxy generate the same 
results, indicating that with regards to firm performance, it is robust over the different proxies 
used (see table 15). 
The proxy used to explain the firm’s financial risk profile was the debt-to-equity ratio. Again, 
it would be preferred to test a market-based risk measure such as a company’s beta. This 
would make my results more robust as it indicate supportive evidence for both accounting- 
and market-based proxies. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain these beta values for a 
significant number of firms in my sample data so to test the robustness of my risk proxy, two 
different accounting measures are used. Both the total short-term debt to short-term assets and 
debt-to-assets produce supportive evidence for the relationship between diversity and risk. It 
is not surprising that the debt to assets proxy supports the findings of by my initial proxy as 
they are closely linked. The rationale behind using short-term debt and assets is to see how the 
operating risk will be affected. In table 15, only the companies’ debt-to-assets ratio is shown. 
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TABLE 15 
Robustness for my dependent proxies in the initial models with alternative dependent proxies. 
 
 Firm Performance Employee Compensation Financial Risk 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Diversity -1.853 (1.021)* -0.272 (0.104)*** 0.236 (0.061)*** 9.284 (4.739)* -0.350 (0.139)** -0.836 (0.243)*** 
∆ diversity 0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.000)** -0.011 (0.007) -0.452 (1.243) -0.001 (0.035) -0.017 (0.071) 
       
Control factors       
Board size -0.026 (0.056) -0.001 (0.009) 0.038 (0.004)*** -0..011 (0.212) 0.009 (0.011) 0.028 (0.028) 
Age   -0.007 (0.002)*** 0.266 (0.129)** -0.018 (0..005)*** -0.023 (0.007)*** 
Risk -0.076 (0.039)* -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.012)   
Size 0.214 (0.171) 0.138 (0.031)*** -0.062 (0.005)*** -1.319 (0.443) 0.101 (0.013)*** 0.177 (0.0223)*** 
Income -0.107 (0.047)** -0.029 (0.006)***     
ROA     -0.064 (0.044) -0.058 (0.060) 
∆ income   -0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.001)   
       
Dummy high/low Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Dummy years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R squared 0.1953 0.2089 0.2961 0.0118 0.1046 0.0948 
Obs. 1057 1057 1009 1003 1056 1042 
Notes: This table shows the initial models (1) and the alternative dependent proxies (2). The alternative proxy used for firm performance is return on equity (ROE), for 
employee compensation is wages divided by total sales, and financial risk is debt-to-assets. The missing squares are control variables not used for that model. Statistical 
significance coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all non-financial Norwegian 
PLCs listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
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My final alternative proxy to see the relationship between gender diversity and compensation 
is calculated as the compensation post divided by total sales. In the same manner that the 
other two alternative proxies are highly correlated with the initial proxies, this also uses the 
same accounting numerator in when designing an alternative dependent proxy. Table 15 
shows that both proxies have the same relationship. 
The validity of my dependent proxies should be considered. Since all my alternative proxies 
possess practically the same properties as the initial proxies, they all lack the necessary range 
to see if my hypotheses endure alterations. To properly test if the proxies used are robust to 
change, the construction should be independent of existing design. I mentioned that marked-
based designs would be a more appropriate way to see how the relationship is consistent to 
detect the phenomenon, but since my data did not have any adequate information to construct 
proper alternative proxies, I designed them in alternative ways concerning the data I had.  
Another important aspect, not covered in this dissertation, is the potential sampling selection 
error. The variables used are not tested for random selection and may be subject to unreliable 
results. Moreover, these two issues are a significant drawback in my analysis, especially for 
the relationship between employee compensation and gender diversity. This relationship has 
no theoretical backing in the current literature that signifies that employee compensation ratio 
will be a good measurement for how female directors reward their employees. Ideally, I 
would have had more information about the structure and levels of compensation to really 
excrete how gender diversity affects employees. 
Alternative explanatory proxy 
I mentioned in section 3.2 that the change in diversity was to detect the scope of diversity 
before it was offset by a further increasing change. The rationale was that it had similar 
properties as a squared diversity ratio however, we saw from the analysis that the change 
proxy did not possess the exact properties to detect the turning point of increased gender 
diversity. In this section, I have substituted the change in diversity with a squared diversity.  
Since there are a significant number of firms without any female directors in several of the 
years in my sample, I have added a small value to all observations in order to have a coherent 
design20. The results are presented in table 16. The coefficients are accompanied by 
heteroscedastic standard errors. 
                                                          
20 The new explanatory variable has added 0.01 in order to be squared.  
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TABLE 16 
Alternative explanatory proxy where change in diversity is replaced with squared diversity. 
 Firm Performance Empl. Compensation Financial Risk 
Diversity -0.510 (0.167)*** 0.250 (0.086)*** -1.458 (0.551)*** 
Diversity^2 0.443 (0.230)* -0.063 (0.179) 1.476 (0.707)** 
    
Control factors    
Board size -0.003 (0.007) 0.038 (0.004)*** 0.034 (0.030) 
Age  0.007 (0.002)*** -0.029 (0.009)*** 
change income  -0.000 (0.000)  
Risk -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)  
Size 0.135 (0.029)*** -0.075 (0.005)*** 0.209 (0.028)*** 
Income -0.033 (0.006)***  
ROA   -0.093 (0.087) 
    
Dummy high/low Yes Yes No 
Dummy years Yes Yes Yes 
    
R squared 0.2030 0.2958 0.1230 
Obs. 1185 1009 1170 
Notes: This table shows alternative explanatory results for my three hypothesis. The alternative model has 
substituted change in diversity with squared diversity plus a small value (0.01). The missing squares are control 
variables not used in that model. Statistical significance coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are marked with 
***, **, and * respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all non-financial Norwegian PLCs 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
We can see that the coefficient for squared diversity is significant for both hypothesis 1 and 3, 
indicating that the effect of gender diversity has a tipping point. The magnitude of this 
coefficient for hypothesis 3 is greater than the negative impact gender diversity has on 
financial risk. This reduces the consistency in my results from my base-case model in section 
4.3 indicating that the amount of females are negatively correlated with risk aversion at all 
levels. The high squared coefficient indicate that the current risk ratio will be moving towards 
more risky structures as the optimal level of diversity to risk is reached. 
For hypothesis 1, there is still a negative impact of the high gender diversity ratio, although 
the squared coefficient is significantly high for this measurement as well. The insignificant 
coefficient in hypothesis 2 indicates that the amount of employee compensation and 
stakeholder awareness experience no significant turning point.  
49 
 
6. Conclusion 
This dissertation analyzes the effect of gender diversity along different aspects in an empirical 
setting to provide any rationale for imposing legal constraints on a board of directors. Existing 
research usually only covers a few of the determinants for board structure and do not account 
for the full explanatory cause. In this research, I have focused on the effect of gender diverse 
boards of director to see if they have any significant impact on different measures such as 
firm performance, employee-awareness, and financial risk profile.  
In the vast existing literature on how gender diversity affects firm performance, I have no 
conclusive evidence that diversity pulls in a clear direction. I do find supporting evidence in 
line with existing literature, that diversity is harmful for firm performance. However, I also 
find a positive relationship between gender diversity and firm performance over the voluntary 
compliance period, suggesting that females do possess qualities attributable to better 
performance. The positive effect in this period may be because the general pool of qualified 
women are still in play, and firms needing independent directors the most are quick to 
appointing them. Another explanation is that well-performing firms are the ones to pursue 
women in the voluntary compliance period and thus creating this positive relationship. We 
saw that firms with above average returns drastically changed the percentages of female 
directors on their boards.  
The positive effect is however lost when forced compliance is imposed. The negative 
significant relationship over the mandatory period offer supportive evidence to Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), who say firms not being able to choose an optimal board with respect to their 
own agenda will lead to a declining value. A reason for this can be the existing board 
members’ attitude to the new female directors, appointing them to disadvantageous positions 
or overriding their contributions. It can also be simply because females underperform in 
competitive settings. Researchers find that although there is no gender gap in single-sex 
competitions, there is a difference when women compete across sexes. 
From other business perspectives, the effect of women directors are different. The perceived 
idea that women are more relationship-oriented and care more about their employees generate 
support from my analysis. I mentioned in section 4.2 that there could be other factors 
affecting employee compensation, and I controlled my results with respects to some 
influencing factors. However, I was not able to control for the exact composition of how 
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employees receive benefits. Nevertheless, the result give weak support to the hypothesis that 
females are more attune to their employees.  
I find conflicting evidence that female directors possess less risk aversion compared to men 
(Adams and Funk, 2011). From my analysis, the relationship between financial risk and 
increased gender diversity is negative. This suggests that more female directors will reduce 
the financial risk of a firm. It does appear however that the negative relationship only endures 
up to a certain level before the effect is lost. It can be that women are more risk-aware than 
risk averse. They do consider the opportunity of financial distress and will abstain from 
excessive risk-taking. This is especially important in retrospect to the recent financial crises, 
where excessive risk-taking and poor judgment led firms into a recession.  
From a social perspective, women are less concerned with shareholder maximization. Which 
may contribute to firms not emphasizing short-term profits. Another social aspect, not 
covered in this paper is the second-run effect female directors bring to inspire the aspiration of 
women to pursue higher management positions and become candidates that are more suitable 
at a later stage. However, a study conducted by Kapital21 in 2012 revealed that the number of 
women in executive positions in Norwegian PLCs had suffered a decrease in recent years 
(Tutchell and Edmond, 2013 pp.30).  
In an overall summary of the dissertation and concluding remarks, I find no conclusive 
evidence from a firm performance perspective for government to mandate gender diversity in 
the boardrooms. The sample period in my analysis does not account for the long-term effects 
greater gender diversity brings to the table. Future researchers should investigate the impact 
female directors has had on firms in the aftermath of the financial crises in 2008. I will also 
recommend further investigations in the impact gender diversity has for its employees. This 
dissertation offers an initial analysis of this relationship, but the complexity of the matter 
encourages in depth scrutiny. Finally, I will urge researchers to investigate the impact 
increased gender diversity has for financial risk. The consequences of more female directors 
can change the risk profile of the firm in an unforeseen way.  
 
 
                                                          
21 Kapital is a biweekly Norwegian Business Magazine covering the latest from economic policies to news from 
the business- and financial sector. 
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8. Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. 
 
TABLE 17 
This table shows the VIF score for the dependent variables used in my models. 
 Base-case models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Diversity 4.818 4.839 5.137 
∆ diversity 1.326 1.324 1.322 
Board size 1.280 1.276 1.284 
Age  1.179 1.168 
∆ income   1.010 
Risk 1.012  1.013 
Size 2.512 1.589 1.460 
Income 2.226   
ROA  1.153  
Dummy high/low 4.083 4.082 4.345 
Dummy year 2.694 2.387 2.273 
Notes: This table shows the VIF score for my variables when included in the same model. High VIF scores can 
cause a multicollinearity problem. The VIF is calculated in an unweighted linear model with 1 df. Dummy 
high/low has been removed from model (3) because of a VIF>5. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is 
all non-financial Norwegian PLCs listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
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Appendix 2. 
 
TABLE 18 
Cross-sectional regression for ROA against gender diversity and control variables 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Diversity -0.349 (0.275) 0.065 (0.330) 0.020 (0.171) 0.018 (0.163) 0.164 (0.103) -0.022 (0.099) -0.028 (0.105) 0.062 (0.226) -0.105 (0.248) 0.303 (0.336) 
           
Control           
∆ diversity 0.077 (0.043)* -0.050 (0.061) -0.012 (0.054) -0.052 (0.023)** -0.107 (0.074) -0.001 (0.023) 0.023 (0.022) 0.089 (0.093) 0.002 (0.128) -0.153 (0.182) 
Board size 0.004 (0.011) 0.024 (0.026) -0.014 (0.009) -0.010 (0.013) -0.017 (0.008)** -0.011 (0.005)** -0.006 (0.008) -0.008 (0.014) -0.027 (0.017) -0.014 (0.006)** 
Risk 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)** 0.010 (0.012) 0.012 (0.019) -0.005 (0.005) 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.007 (0.003)** -0.001 (0.000)* 0.001 (0.017) -0.001 (0.000)** 
Size 0.191 (0.082)** 0.231 (0.051)*** 0.086 (0.027)*** 0.077 (0.035)** 0.030 (0.022) 0.032 (0.019)* 0.040 (0.025) 0.176 (0.031)*** 0.157 (0.046)*** 0.137 (0.033)*** 
Income -0.083 (0.036)** -0.087 (0.021)*** -0.031 (0.012)** -0.015 (0.009)* -0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0..006) -0.004 (0.007) -0.061 (0.010)*** -0.041 (0.015)** -0.034 (0.008)*** 
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
R squared 0.3361 0.4167 0.2291 0.2749 0.2599 0.2355 0.2782 0.5015 0.3757 0.3837 
Obs. 129 130 116 117 129 138 141 157 143 135 
Notes: This table shows the effect of gender diversity in a cross-sectional OLS analysis. Dependent variable is the firms return on assets (ROA). Statistical significance 
coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are marked with ***, **, and * respectively. Table 6 defines the variables, and the sample is all non-financial Norwegian PLCs listed 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
